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I.

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT IN.REBUTTAL

A. INTRODUCTION

The facts presented in the record .demonstrate a tripartite contractual
relationship between the Aardemas, Westfalia and U.S. Dairy who engaged in a
commercial transaction governed by the UCC, the manufacturer's warranty and the
service contract. To hold that tort law has any place in this case would be to
deprive Westfalia and U.S. Dairy of their rights under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") and contract law. Westfalia and U.S. Dairy had every right to believe that
the UCC and contract law, not tort law, was applicable to their transaction in light
of the .holding of Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 757
P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988). This could not be more clearly demonstrated than
through Myers' application to an allegation of damage to dairy cows by a pulsation
system in DeVries v. Delaval, Inc. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41

(2006). The

Aardemas, not the Appellants, are asking this Court to modify the law of Idaho
regarding the economic loss rule.
Here, the Aardemas failed to submit any admissible evidence which supports
their contention that their cows suffered any injury which qualifies for an exception
to the economic loss rule. The Aardemas also failed to submit any evidence which
supports their contention that a special relationship existed between them and
Westfalia and/or U.S. Dairy, thereby giving rise to an exception to the economic
loss rule.

By their silence, the Aardemas have abandoned any claim that the

special circumstances exception applies here.
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B. RESPONDENTS MISSTATE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW .

Recognizing that the record does not contain any admissible evidence of
damage to their cows, the Aardemas argue that the review in this case is. limited to
abstract legal questions. They contend that this Court may not examine the record
to determine if there is, in fact, an absence of evidence which qualifies for the
"damage to other property" exception. This is a disingenuous argument in light of
the fact that the question presented is, "What type of damage to other property
qualifies for the exception."
In support of their argument, the Aardemas cite Winn v. Freshar, 116 Idaho
500, 777 P. 2d 772 (1989). In Winn, while this Court did not look behind findings
of fact made by the District Court in order to determine if they were supported by
the record, it did determine the applicability of a principle of law to the facts
presented by the District Judge in the form of findings of fact.

Here the District

Court did not make findings of fact. The District Court has asked this Court to
determine if the facts in the record constitute "damage to other property" of the
type which gives rise to an exception to the economic loss rule.
In addition to Winn, the Aardemas cite several federal cases, i.e., Amundsen

v. Jones, 533 F. 3d 1192, 1199 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2008), Barella v. City of
Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 136 n. 2 (3 rd Cir. 2007) and Valdes v. Crosby, 450
F.3d 1231, 1236 (11 th Cir. 2006) for the proposition that review on interlocutory
appeal is limited to controlling questions of law.

These federal cases are

inapplicable because they are dealing with interlocutory appeals of
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qualified

immunity questions pursuant to a special procedure adopted by the United States
Supreme Court with respect to determination of a qualifie\l immunity prior to
proceeding with the litigation.
Since the district court here made no explicit factual findings with respect to
the nature and extent of the damage, if any, to the cows, this Court must ferret
out the facts on which to base its legal conclusions from the record.
Here the controlling question is whether the record on appeal demonstrates
an injury to other property of the type which qualifies as an exception to the
economic loss rule. Consequently this Court must look at the record to determine
if there are admissible facts in the record to support an exception to the economic
loss rule. It must be kept in mind that the determination of a motion for summary
judgment must be based upon admissible evidence, not allegations and possibilities.
With respect to the critical issue of whether there was damage to
Respondents' cows the District Court noted " ... that the Plaintiffs have adequately
contended in this record that the milk production was reduced and their cattle were

injured." The Court relies upon the "Plaintiff's Complaint" for this contention. Tr.,
Vol. I., p. 55)(emphasis added). The District Court also stated:
" ... So I don't think there's any question in this record as to the fact
that the Plaintiffs have alleged that their cattle were injured by the
property which was the subject of the transaction .... "
Id. (emphasis added).

The Court then added that " ... agents of the Defendants

had noted the injuries that may occur to the cattle themselves as a result of a
defective product." Id. at p. 57. (Emphasis Added)
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Allegations and possibilities are not sufficient to overcome a motion for
summary judgment.

When "the Defendant moves for summary judgment on the

basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the
Plaintiff's case, the Plain.tiff must establish the existence of an issue of fact
regarding that element."

Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 920 P.2d

67, 70, 128 Idaho 851 (1996) reh'g denied.
"Further, a non-moving party's failure to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the
entry of summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett [477 U.S. 317,
106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1986)]. See also I. R. C. P.
56{c). "In such a situation, there can be no 'genuine issue as to any
material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning any central
element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 322-323."
Jarman v. Hale 122 Idaho 952, 842 P. 2d 288 {Ct. App. 1992).

Thus, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the Aardemas' case
must be anchored in something more solid than mere speculation. "A plaintiff must
do more than present a scintilla of evidence, and merely raising the 'slightest
doubt' as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue." Id; Edwards v.
Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 853 (Ct. App. 1986). Furthermore, "the party

opposing the motion may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the
pleadings; rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition must be produced to
contradict the assertions of the moving party."

Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School

District No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584 {Ct. App. 1995) quoting Podolan v. Idaho
Legal Aid Services, Inc., {123 Idaho 937 {Ct. App. 1993).
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C. RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS MISSTATES KEY FACTS AND
DRAWS IMPROPER CONCLUSIONS THEREFROM;

In order for this Court to determine whether an exception to the economic·
loss rule applies, the Court must first be shown what type of property damage
actually occurred. The Aardemas have not shown any property damage which
gives rise to an exception to the economic loss rule.

Nor have they shown that

they purchased a Westfalia product because Westfalia represented itself to the
Aardemas as having special expertise in a determination of the type of product the
Aardemas needed to realize their commercial expectations. The UCC provides for
an implied warranty of fitness for the buyer's particular purpose. The Aardemas are
attempting to torture the implied or express warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose into a special relationship.
Respondents' Statement of Facts, as set forth in Respondents' /CrossAppellants' Brief, misstates several key facts of this case or draws improper
conclusions therefrom. For example, Respondents presume, without a basis in the
Record, that the ProFORM Milking System "was intended to accommodate dairies
with smaller milking parlors."

Respondents' Brief, p. 4.

After making this

statement, Respondents go on to imply, as a result of this assumption, the milking
system was "overextended" which "caused the pulsators to malfunction" in the
present matter. Id.

Respondents then attempt to use these efforts at speculation

as a spring board for the unsupported assumption that the pulsators alleged
"malfunction" caused their cows to suffer injury or damage.
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All of these statements are based upon the Respondents' reliance upon the
report of their "master electrician," Larry Neubauer.

Significantly, the Record is

devoid of any qualifications that Mr .. Neubauer has to offer an admissible opinion on
cow health or injuries. As such, this type of opinion is· entirely outside the scope of
this individual's expertise. If the Court looks closely at Respondents' Statement of
Facts, it will see that any statemerits of actual physical injury to the cows in
question are unsupported by the Record.

Specific references are made to the

Record with respect to Mr. Neubauer's conclusions regarding the operating system
and the alleged malfunction, however, any time Respondents suggest a causal link
between the malfunction and any resulting damage, their brief is silent.
For example, on Page 5 of their brief, Respondents suggest that "The result
of the malfunction was damage to the cows and decreased milk production."
Respondents' Brief, p. 5.

Record.

This statement lacks a citation to any evidence in the

Such an allegation should not be treated as a "fact" for purposes of

deciding the appeal.

Respondents clearly had the opportunity at the summary

judgment stage to present evidence to support their contentions and chose to rely
solely on the testimony of an expert not qualified to speak on the subject at hand.
Later in Respondents' Statement of Facts, they make the claim that,
"[Respondents] also have engaged two veterinarians who have rendered opinions
that the

cows

have suffered

Respondents' Brief, p. 7.

injuries

from

the

malfunctioning

pulsators."

Noticeably absent is any evidence in the record of the

opinions directly from these veterinarians.

Appellants question why, if this
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information actually exists, it was not presented at the district court level for
consideration at the summary judgment hearing. In reality, Respondents had every
opportunity to present this type of 1;ividence and failed to do so. To make such an
unfounded contention at this stage in the appellate proceedings without support in
the underlying record speaks volumes about the lack of support Respondents could
muster for their argument that their cows were somehow harmed.

As will be

discussed further, a large majority of this case focuses on Respondents' ability to
prove damage or injury to their dairy herd. They cannot create such harm out of a
silent record at this late stage.
Respondents essentially admit in their brief that the record does not contain
actual evidence supporting harm to their cows an

by falling back on the District

Judge's acknowledgment that physical injury was plead in their initial Complaint
and their Amended Complaint.

However, for purposes of prevailing at summary

judgment and upon appeal, mere allegations in a pleading should not be seen as
sufficient to warrant denying a motion.

Respondents' case should have been

anchored in something more solid than mere speculation.

"The plaintiff must do

more than present a scintilla of evidence, and merely raising the 'slightest doubt' as
to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue." Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 853 (Ct.App. 1986).

Furthermore, "the party opposing the

motion may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the pleadings; rather,
evidence by way of affidavit or deposition must be produced to contradict the
assertions of the moving party." Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School District No. 412,
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126 Idaho 581, 584 (Ct.App. 1995) quoting Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services,
Inc., 12.3 Idaho 937 (Ct.App. 1993).

Finally, in their Statement of facts, Respondents fail to establish any special
circumstances which make it equitable to impose a tort duty on Westfalia or U.S.
Dairy.

The

UCC

provides

all

of

the

protection

needed

by

the

buyer.

Correspondingly, the UCC provides the seller with protection against unlimited
liability arising out of a sales transaction.
In an attempt to counter arguments such as these, Respondents cite to a
number of depositions taken of representatives of Westfalia, which they suggest
show admissions on the part of the company that a malfunctioning milking system
can injure a cow.

Unfortunately, the deposition citations referenced were taken

out of context and totally mischaracterize the testimony of the individuals involved.
Specifically, Respondents assert that, "Westfalia representatives conceded that
malfunctioning pulsators cause physical injury to dairy cows." Respondents' Brief,
p. 5. Again, this statement is not specifically linked to a particular portion of the
record or Respondents' cows in any way.

As mentioned above, it would be

improper to draw any conclusions from these broad statements relative to the
Aardemas' case. A more accurate statement based upon the testimony would be
that a malfunction "could" potentially cause an injury. Respondents cannot point
to any particular testimony where a Westfalia representative stated that an alleged
malfunction in the present matter actually caused any injuries to the cows at issue
in this appeal.

APPELLANTS'/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF- 8

Jeff Sriyder, one of the Westfalia representatives referred to by Respondents
in their brief, specifically testified in response to questions about the potential for
problems or injury that, " ... a possibility exists but is not always the result." See
R., Vol. I., p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1 /4/08 (Exhibit A to Aff., Snyder Dep.

p. 24, LI. 6-7).

This is clearly not the smoking gun that Respondents attempt to

make it out to be. Mr. Snyder further testified that a malfunction could potentially
be one of the things that causes injury, however, that is ". . . one of the huge list
of things that could affect the cow's somatic cell count." Id. at p. 26, LI. 14-15
(emphasis added).

Obviously, there are many things that could change the

potential production output for a particular cow, many of which have no
relationship to a milking system.

Respondents cannot cite to any specific

statement by Mr. Snyder that the system involved in this case caused any injury to
the cows in question.
The testimony cited from Earl Patterson's deposition should also

be

examined in the same light. Again, Mr. Patterson made no explicit statement that
the system in question caused any injuries to Respondents' cows.

As with Mr.

Snyder's testimony, Mr. Patterson's testimony at deposition in response to general
questions as to whether a malfunction in the system would result in injury, was
always qualified and in his responses he stated that it was only a "possibility" or
"could" happen. See R., Vol. I., p. 193, Exhibits, Whitehead Aff., 1 /4/08 (Exhibit
C to Aff., Patterson Dep. p. 25, I. 18 - p. 26. I. 21 ). He specifically explained that
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a malfunctioning system was just one of the many possible causes for increased
somatic.cell count and decreased production. Id.
The record demonstrates nothing more than· a claim of disappointed
expectations. Dr. Behr' s report underscores this conclusfon. There, he states that,
prior to use of the new system, the Aardema cows were producing at the rate of
66 pounds of milk per cow per day. Dr. Behr computes damages on the basis that
the production did not increase, as expected, to 85 pounds per day. Dr. Behr starts
his damage calculation with the cows producing 20,321 pounds per cow per year
and projects that, but for the defective equipment, it would have risen to 26,000
pounds per cow per year. (On average a cow lactates for 305 days and is dry for
60 days. Hence, 20,321 divided by 305 equals 66.6 pounds per day and 26,000
divided by 305 equals 85 pounds per day) The record and his report are devoid of
any scientifically supported basis for the conclusion that the increase did not occur
because of the pulsation system rather than other causes or because the cows
simply were not genetically capable of such production.
If the Aardemas wanted assurance that the systems they purchased would
increase the production they were experiencing from 66 pounds of milk per cow
per day to some higher level, they were required to negotiate for that performance.
There is no evidence they sought or received or relied upon advice of Westfalia or
U.S. Dairy to this effect, and the contracts for the installation of the system did not
contain any specific performance provisions.

See R., Vol. I., Exhibits, Highley

Affidavit, 12/21 /07, (Exhibit A to Affidavit - 2/15/00 Contract).
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As mentioned above, there are a multitude of different ailments, conditions
or events that could
Respondents.

have accounted for the alleged losses sustained by

It was Respondents' burden at the hearing on the summary

judgment motion to establish these facts, which they failed to do.

As such,

Respondents have not established or referred to any credible, admissible evidence
in the record supporting their claim of harm to their cows.
Instead, they ask this Court to rely on an electrician's questionable report
about an area outside his area of purported expertise.

Even today, they cannot

point to anything in the record, other than unqualified statements by their other
"experts" to show that any injury or physical damage actually occurred.

D. RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATING DAMAGE TO OTHER PROPERTY PREVENTS THE
APPLICATION OF AN EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE.
The facts material to a determination of whether the Aardemas are entitled
to an exception from the principle that the economic loss rule bars tort claims are:
A.

Whether there is admissible evidence of damage to other property which
qualifies for an exception to the economic loss rule; and

8.

Whether there is admissible evidence of a special relationship or special
circumstances

relating to a transaction between the Aardemas and

Westfalia or the Aardemas and U.S. Dairy.
U.S. Dairy contracted to design and install a milking system in each of four
dairy parlors built by Vance Dairy Construction. See R., Vol. I., Exhibits, Highley
Affidavit, 12/21 /07, (Exhibit A to Affidavit - 2/15/00 Contract).
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U.S. Dairy

purchased components from various sources. The components for the pulsation
system installed in each parlor were purchased by U.S. Dairy from Westfalia.
As mentioned above, the record is devoid of any submitted affidavits,
depositions or other admissible evidence which establishes ( 1) there was damage
to Respondents' cows; (2} the nature of the damage, if any, to Respondents'
cows; (3) a sudden or calamitous event which injured their cows; (4) the pulsation
system was dangerous as opposed to disappointing with respect to performance;
or (5) there was a reliance on Westfalia or U.S.Dairy giving rise to

special

circumstances or a special relationship.
Evidence of decreased milk production, reduced milk quality or increased
somatic cell counts does not qualify as the type of damage which supports an
exception to the economic loss rule. They are strictly disappointed expectations,
not actual physical harm.
If the pulsation system, which is controlled by electricity, electrocuted a cow
or caused electrical burns to her teats which prevented milking until they healed, it
could possibly qualify as damage to cows of a sufficient nature to allow a claim for
attendant economic losses. However, such a claim could only include the extent of
production lost while the injury healed. There is no evidence to support such a
contention.
As noted above, Westfalia employees Vern Foster (Foster dep .. pp 24-25),
Earl Patterson,(Patterson dep .. pp. 24-30) Jeffery Snyder (Snyder dep .. pp. 24-26)
and Norman Schuring (Schuring dep. pp. 49) testified that a defective or
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malfunctioning pulsation system could be a possible cause of injuries to cows, that
it could, not would, cause injuries to cows, that it theoretically can cause injury to
cows but pointed· out that there are other reasons and bigger factors than milking
systems which cause injuries and that· sticking pulsatoi's could be caused by lack of
cleaning rather than defect.

None of the Westfalia employees' testimony

established that ( 1) there was injury to the Aardema cows or (2) that injury to the
Aardema cows was caused by a defective Westfalia or U.S. Dairy product.
Neither Lawrence Neubauer nor Michael Behr are qualified to testify with
respect to whether and to what extent, if any, the equipment caused injury to the
cows.

In order for their testimony to be admissible on this point, it would be

incumbent upon the Aardemas to demonstrate that they are qualified on the
subject of damage to cows.

Neither report demonstrates qualifications to support

a conclusion that the Aardemas' cows were, based upon veterinary medical
probability, physically injured by the pulsation system. See Weeks v. Eastern Idaho
Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 1535 P. 3d 1180, 1183 (2007) which states,
"The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the
individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony ... " Id. The
Aardemas'

reliance

on

the

deposition

testimony of

Westfalia

employees

demonstrates the insufficiency of the Aardemas' evidence. That a malfunctioning
pulsation system might cause damage is irrelevant to the issues raised in this case.
The question here is whether, to a probability, it did.
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Neubauer argues that uncontrolled electricity affects the operation · of the
plungers "such that the vacuum is not controlled as predicatively [sic] as it should
be in order to ensure the best milking conditions and the good health of the cows."
Assurance of "the best milking conditions and the good health of the cows" is best
handled by the law of contracts and warranty, not tort.
The evidence in the record does not demonstrate a product which destroyed
or physically injured cows. There is no evidence of lacerated or bruised teats or
other indicia of damaging, physical impact. There is no evidence of electrocution or
electrical burning.

The evidence, at best, demonstrates that the Aardemas' cows

produced 66 pounds of milk per day rather than the hoped for 85 pounds of milk
per day during the period of time they were milked by the system as installed by
U.S. Dairy.

This is not evidence of an unsafe product. It is merely evidence of

disappointed expectations which are most properly addressed under the Uniform
Commercial Code and the law of contract.
E. THE BAR OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN IDAHO AND ITS
EXCEPTIONS

Both the Aardemas and the Idaho Dairymen's Association claim in their
respective briefs that Westfalia and U.S. Dairy advocate change in Idaho's law with
respect to the economic loss rule.

To the contrary, Westfalia and U.S. Dairy are

simply claiming that the District Court should have followed established Idaho law.
In actuality, it is the Aardemas and the IDA who are advocating for a sweeping
change to the economic loss rule. As will be discussed in more detail below, the
IDA suggests a total overhaul of the rule and essentially argues ignoring the UCC
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based solely upon the contention that because of the size of the parties involved in
this matter, the actual contract negotiated is an adhesion contract which unfairly
benefits the manufacture. However, this argument entirely disregards the fact that
there were other manufacturers and dealers in the market that the Aardemas could
have approached for a different contract.

Instead, Appellants' contend that the

evidence in the record conforms with that relied upon by Supreme Courts of other
states applying the economic loss rule, which is also consistent with the
established application of the rule within the State of Idaho.
The economic loss rule had its genesis in Seely v. White Motor Co. 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 403 P. 2d 145 ( 1965). Idaho adopted the rule in Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P. 2d 784 (1978).

Idaho applied the rule to

dairy cows in Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 757 P. 2d
695 (App. 1988).
996 (2004)

In Blahd v. Richard 8. Smith, Inc. 141 Idaho 296, 108 P. 3d

Idaho adopted, as part of the economic loss rule, the integrated

system bar to tort claims.
In an agricultural setting the Supreme Courts of Michigan, Minnesota and
Wisconsin in Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W. 2d 683 (Minn. 1990), Neibarger v.
Universal Cooperatives, 486 N.W. 2d 612 (Mich. 1992) and Grams v. Milk
Products, Inc. 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699, N.W. 2d 167 (2005) adopted an approach

like that of Myers. Minnesota legislatively overruled Hapka. It is respectfully
suggested that if Myers is to be overruled after being the law of Idaho for twenty
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years it should be done only by the legislature. It has been the guiding light upon
which commerce has gauged its risks for 20 years.
The above-mentioned out-of-state cases were addressed at length in
Appellants' brief and will .not be revisited here.

However, the case of Nelson v.

Todd's Ltd., 426 N . W. 2d 120 (Iowa, 1988) is an illustration of how yet another

agricultural state addressed the issue; There, at page 125, the Supreme Court of
Iowa stated:
"We agree that the line to be drawn is one between tort and contract
rather than between physical harm and economic loss. As we draw
that line, the harm to the Nelson's meat falls on the contract-warranty
side. The damage was the foreseeable result from a failure of the
product to work properly because of a defect or omission from the
product. When, as here, the loss relates to a consumer or user's
disappointed expectations due to deterioration, internal breakdown or
non-accidental cause, the remedy lies in contract. See Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 84, 61 Ill. Dec. 746, 763, 435
N.E. 2d 443, 450 (1982).
Tort theory, on the other hand, is generally appropriate when
the harm is a sudden or dangerous occurrence, frequently involving
some violence or collision with external objects, resulting from a
genuine hazard in the nature of the product defect. For example, had
Quick Qure caused chemical burns to the Nelson's hands or damaged
their meat processing equipment, an action would lie in strict tort
liability. That sort of harm could not have been reasonably anticipated
by the contracting parties, and would be a hazard peripheral to sale."
As noted in Clark, the comprehensive provisions of the UCC should be
preferred over tort in commercial transactions. This being the case, application of
the "damage to other property" exception to the economic loss rule should be
carefully limited as was done in Myers and 8/ahd.

It must also be kept in mind
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that, in the commercial sector, both buyers and sellers. have relied on the teaching
of Myers since its decision in 1988, twenty years ago.
The Idaho Dairymen's Association at pages 5 and 6 of its Amicus brief
argues that neither Myers nor DeVries discussed exceptions to the economic loss
rule. This is a puzzling, and quite frankly disingenuous, argument since both do
clearly address the "damage to other property" exception to the economic loss rule.
The DeVries case even deals with its application to a defective pulsation system.
DeVries clearly indicates that Magistrate Williams considered Myers to dispel a

contention virtually identical to that made by the Aardemas. U.S. District Judge
Edward Lodge in affirming Magistrate Williams states:
"The Devries object to the magistrate judge's
recommendation that summary judgment be granted on
the strict liability claim. However, as the magistrate
judge's
analysis
demonstrates,
(Report
and
Recommendation at 26-28), the Idaho case law indicates
that the damages the DeVries seek are of the kind that
are not recoverable
under a strict liability cause of
action. See Myers Clark v. International Harvester Co.,
581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978) (explaining that economic
loss not recoverable in tort action); Myers v. A. 0. Smith
Harvestore Products, Inc., 757 P.2d 695, 699 (Ct. App.
1988) (explaining that physical damage to dairy cattle
due to faulty feed storage and delivery system is really
claim of economic loss sounding in contract)."
The Aardemas argue in their brief at page 33 that Myers established a bright
line rule that any damage to other property gives rise to the exception. This is
clearly contrary to Myers which held that "cattle illness" and "property damage"
did not qualify for the exception when the claimed damages arise from the "failure
of the product to match buyer's commercial expectations." The court also notes it
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important that' the injuries did not result from a "cala111itous event or a dangerous
failure of the product." Myers, 114 Idaho at 436.
In order to· deflect the ,clear. import of DeVries and Myers, the Aardemas
make the quantum leap claiming their alleged economic losses were parasitic to
damage to their cows.

However, as noted above, they failed to produce any

admissible evidence that their cows suffered any damage at all and certainly failed
to demonstrate that their cows suffered damage of the type which qualifies for an
exception to economic loss rule. Again, if the machine had pulled the teats off the
cows or electrocuted them, the Aardemas could perhaps make a more plausible
case for application of the exception.
Instead, all Respondents can direct the Court to is an allegation

that the

plungers in the pulsators stuck which resulted in a lower rate of production than
the Aardemas expected from their cows. The Ardemas' claim is that cows which
were, on average, producing milk at the rate of 66 pounds per cow per day when
the system was installed, did not reach their productive expectation of 85 pounds
per cow per day.

This a disappointed expectation which is best covered by

warranty law.
It is significant that the claim is not that demonstrated productive capability
was reduced, but that it did not increase at the rate expected. Any such
expectation, to be recoverable if it is not achieved, can only be based upon
contract, not tort.
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In their· original and amended complaints, the.· Aardemas ·asserted· claims
based upon contract, express warranty and implied warranty as well as tort. When
faced with motions for summary judgment on the basis that the economic loss rule
barred their tort claims,. the Aardemas, without explanation, dismissed their
contract and warranty claims. One must ask why? Since no reason was given in
the motion to dismiss the contract and warranty claims, it is fair to assume that the
Aardemas wanted to deprive Westfalia and U.S. Dairy of all of their rights and
defenses under the UCC and contract jurisprudence.
The UCC is a comprehensive system which provides a fair balance between
buyer and seller. It provides the buyer with the right to recover damages, including
consequential damages, if the product purchased is not merchantable or not fit for
the purpose intended. See Idaho Code§ 28-2-714 and 28-2-715.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code the seller may disclaim express and
implied warranties, may modify or limit remedies and is entitled to the defense of
lack of notice. See Idaho Code § 28-2-316, 28-2-719, 28-2-607 (3).
The Idaho Dairymen's Association in its Amicus brief argues that small
dairymen have no bargaining power with multinational corporations. They suggest
that a single dairyman has no realistic ability to dictate the terms of any agreement
he or she enters into with a corporate vendor, and, as a result, any contract
developed is purely one of adhesion. The IDA totally ignores the protections within
the UCC and suggests that because of the relative size of the parties, the small
dairymen will have no chance to pursue any of the remedies outlined in the law.
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Interestingly, the IDA does not provide any evidence or case law suggesting that
this is really the case. The Uniform Commercial Code adequately protects a small
buyer from a large seller. There are no provisions in the law that single out a party
based upon their size.

The UCC was drafted to fairly treat. both parties to a

commercial transaction. The IDA's argument also overlooks the fact that there are
usually multiple sources in the marketplace to purchase milking equipment in the
dairy industry,· which gives the "small dairymen" the opportunity to compare
different proposals from the various suppliers and make an educated decision on
which product best suits their needs.

The IDA's position, if adopted, would

represent a major change in Idaho law.
Looking at the IDA's argument as it relates to the present matter, the
Aardemas are hardly a small buyer. The 15,000 cows they milk through their four
parlors which contain some Westfalia equipment have a value of $30 to $40
million.

When you consider the land, the buildings and the equipment taken

together, this is an enterprise having assets worth well over $100 million. A buyer
such as the Aardemas certainly has bargaining power when it buys $4 million
worth of equipment.
All buyers, large or small, have the protection of the Courts under the
Uniform Commercial Code.

Idaho Code § 28-2-719 and 28-2-302 provide that a

buyer may be relieved of a disclaimer of express or implied warranties or a
modification or a limitation of remedies contained in the contract of sale if the
buyer demonstrates that the warranties failed of their essential purpose or were
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unconscionable. Upon such a determination the buyer is entitled to recover the full
spectrum of damages provided by Idaho Code § 28-2-714 and 28-2-715.
It is important to note that in Idaho Code § 28-2-318, it is provided that
seller may not exclude or limit injuries to persons in ·a consumer's household but
makes no mention, and thereby permits exclusion of injury to property.
One of the important limitations that a seller has under the UCC is the ability
to limit its warranty to injuries caused by defects in the product and allows for a
provision that the warranty will be void if the product is misused, abused or
modified. This is a very important right under the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Uniform Commercial Code provides certainty and protection to both buyers and
sellers in a comprehensive fashion.

F.
RESPONDENTS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WITH RESPECT TO
WESTFALIA WHICH QUALIFIES FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS
RULE
At pages 35-38 of the Aardemas' brief they argue that there is substantial
evidence of a special relationship with Westfalia but do not supply a single citation
to the record.

See Respondents' Brief, pp. 35-38.

Other than in the title of the

section commencing on page 35 of their brief, the Aardemas make no mention,
much less cite any portion of the record to support exceptional circumstances, thus
abandoning any such argument.

Id.

With respect to Westfalia, the Aardemas

argue that there are genuine issues of fact regarding exceptional circumstances
and/or a special relationship as an exception to the economic loss rule.
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The

Aardemas have presented no evidence that would support a special relationship or
special circumstances justifying an exception to the economic loss rule.
The Aardemas rely on Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho
1002, 895 P. 2d 1195 (1995) to support their argument that a special relationship
existed between the Aardemas and Westfalia. The Aardemas argue that Westfalia
had expertise regarding the equipment which it manufactured and sold.

The

Aardemas argue that under Duffin, Westfalia had a special relationship to the
Aardemas because it had greater knowledge of its products than the Aardemas ..
To the contrary, Duffin clearly expresses the proposition that a special relationship
arises if, and only if, the seller holds himself out as having expertise regarding a
specialized function and by doing do, induces reliance upon his superior knowledge
and skill.
In Duffin ICIA was the only certifier of seed. Here there are a number of
companies who sell pulsation systems.
There is no evidence that the Aardemas sought or received advice from
Westfalia regarding any particular subject. Westfalia had a product which it sold to

U.S. Dairy which U.S. Dairy in turn installed as part of an overall system which
U.S. Dairy sold to the Aardemas. The relationship between Westfalia and the
Aardemas is no different than the relationship between any manufacturer and an
end-user in a commercial transaction.
There is no evidence that the Aardemas sought advice from Westfalia
regarding whether the pulsation system, which was being installed by U.S. Dairy,
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would increase the Aardemas' production to 85 pounds of milk per cow,. per day
from the 66 pounds per cow, per day which they were experiencing at the time of
installation.
The UCC, particularly its provisions with respect to · express and implied
warranties, governs the nature of the relationship between buyer and seller.
The special relationship discussed in Duffin is based upon the sale of a
service, not a product.

G. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED U.S. DAIRY TO JOIN IN
THE OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PARTICIPATE IN THE ARGUMENTS AT HEARING.
Respondents argue that the district court impermissibly took up the issue of
the economic loss rule and special relationship exception as it related to U.S. Dairy.
Procedurally, U.S. Dairy joined with the other defendants' summary judgment
arguments as they related to Respondents' negligence claims, once Respondents
dismissed their contract based claims.

Judge Bevan astutely determined that the

issues raised by Freedom and Westfalia were nearly identical to those that were
raised by U.S. Dairy, and as a result, there would be no prejudice on that part of
the Respondents to allow U.S. Dairy to join in these arguments at the hearing. The
District Court also sought to address the issue of whether the "special relationship"
exception to the economic loss rule applied, and properly ruled that it did not.
As the Court is well aware, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a judge
to, " ... to alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good
cause shown." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Clearly, if U.S. Dairy's arguments with respect to
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the economic 'loss issues mirrored those of the other defendants, there was no
need to provide Respondents additional time to respond to U.S. Dairy's request for
summary judgment.

Interestingly, .this Court had previously addressed a similar

argument involving a summary judgment motion in the recent appeal of Gem State
Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 175 · P.3d 172, 174 (Idaho 2007), which also arose before

Judge Bevan.
There, the district court dealt with a summary judgment motion involving a
negligence claim related to a fire allegedly caused by a subcontractor on a
construction project.

On appeal, one of the issues heard by this Court was

whether Hutchison was entitled to present oral argument before the district court
at the summary judgment hearing.

See Gem State Ins. Co., 175 P.3d at 176.

Gem State argued that a party's failure to file a brief in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment precludes that party from presenting argument on the motion.
Gem State's argument was based upon the interplay between I.R.C.P. 56(c) and
I.R.C.P. 56(e).

Id. As this Court pointed out:

"I.R.C.P 56(c) provides that "[t]he adverse party shall also serve an
answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing."
(emphasis added). I.R.C.P. 56(e) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If the party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
party."
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See id. at 176 (emphasis added by the Court).

In light of the facts of the case,

Gem State argued that since Hutchinson had not filed a response per I.R.C.P.
56(c), he should be precluded from presenting oral argument on the issue at
hearing.
Notwithstanding the above, this Court delved more fully into the wording of
the rule and determined that:
"I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides the sanctions that a trial court may, in the
exercise of its discretion, impose upon a party for failure to comply
with the requirements of that rule. In the event of a party's failure to
comply with the requirements of the rule, "[t]he court ... may impose
costs, attorney fees and sanctions against a party or the party's
attorney, or both."

Id. at 176 (emphasis added).

Interestingly though, this Court went on to

find that certain wording in the rule was missing, and as a result:
"The rule simply does not provide for exclusion of a party from
participation in summary judgment as a sanction. "

Id. (emphasis added).

Based upon the above, this Court went on to order that,

"The district court did not err when it overruled Gem State's objection to
Hutchison's participation." Id. (emphasis added).
Obviously, Judge Bevan had this recent ruling in mind when he allowed U.S.
Dairy to join in the other defendants' motions for summary judgment and present
argument at the hearing. He correctly deemed under I.R.C.P. 56(c) that he had the
discretion to determine which parties could participate in the summary judgment
hearing and he felt that it was appropriate for U.S. Dairy to join because U.S.
Dairy's position did not involve the introduction of any new facts.
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The district

court's decision is further supported by the fact that the Respohdents failed to
request additional time or briefiilg to respond to U.S. Dairy's joinder and did not
attempt a motion to reconsider after the fact.
In further support of the district court's decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals
previously found that summary judgment may be entered by a court sua sponte on
grounds other than those raised by the moving party in Mason v. Tucker &

Assocs., 125 Idaho 429 {Ct. App. 1994).

In Mason, the Court of Appeals

explained that generally, Rule 7 {b) {1 ) requires notice to the nonmoving party of the
grounds for a motion. See Mason, 125 Idaho at 432. Referring to a prior decision
by this Court, the justices continued to note that good practice demands that the
basis of a motion and the relief sought shall be clearly stated" so that the other
party may not complain of surprise or prejudice." Id.

{citing to Patton v. Patton,

88 Idaho 288, 292, (1965)). However, the Court of Appeals further clarified that:
"We do not suggest that summary judgment may never be entered by
a court sua sponte or on grounds other than those raised by the
moving party. However, in such event, the party against whom the

judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and
an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be
entered."
Mason, 125 Idaho at 423 (emphasis added).
H. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT NO SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS AND U.S. DAIRY
The record in this matter is clear in that Respondents had "adequate advance
notice" with respect to the economic loss arguments and the issues surrounding
the special relationship exception.

Both Freedom Electric and Westfalia raised
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arguments based upon the applicability of the economic loss rule.

See R., Vol I.,

pp. 82-85, 96-98, 99-101 (Freedom & Westfalia's Motions for Summary Judgment
and Westfalia's Joinder in Fre.edom's Motion).

These motions, filed well outside

the 28 day notice requirement of I.R.C.P. 56, placed Respondents on notice of the
above-stated issue.
Freedom's Memorandum in Support specifically addressed the special
relationship exception and set out the relevant case law. See R., Vol I., Exhibits,
Memorandum in Support of Freedom Electric's Motion for Summary Judgment,
11 /21 /07, pp. 9-12. It is without support for Respondents to now argue that they
did not have an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not
have been entered with respect to this issue when it was laid out before them a
month and a half before the hearing.
Additionally, Respondents had the opportunity to brief this issue in their
responsive pleadings to Freedom and Westfalia's motions, which they did on
January 4, 2008.

See, R. Vol. I., Exhibits, [Respondents'] Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants Westfaliasurge and Patterson's Motion for Summary
Judgment, 1/4/08, pp. 5-10; see also R., Vol. I., Exhibits, Plaintiffs' Memorandum
in Response to Freedom Electric's Motion for Summary Judgment, 1/4/08. As the
Court can see, Respondents abandoned their claims against Freedom and raised
objections to Westfalia's economic loss arguments which are nearly identical to
those they are raising in this appeal.

See id.

Respondents asserted, without

evidentiary foundation, that Westfalia's employees, by virtue of their knowledge of
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the milking system, fell within the special relationship exception. Id. Respondents
took the same position relative to U.S. Dairy and its employees when Respondents
objected to U.S. Dairy seeking summary judgment on the same ground.

The

district court considered that argument and, as it held with respect to Wesfalia, it
ruled there was no special relationship between the Aardemas and U.S. Dairy
sufficient to allow economic losses to be sought.
The facts as they

relate to U.S.

Dairy's business relationship with

Respondents are hardly different than those raised by the other defendants at the
hearing. As mentioned above, U.S Dairy contracted to install milking components
provided by Westfalia for a sophisticated business customer who was running a
large dairy operation.

U.S. Dairy was not the Aardemas only option for milking

equipment in Idaho, as there are a number of other manufacturers' dealers who
could have provided similar products.

Following the delivery and set-up of the

product, U.S. Dairy technicians conducted limited maintenance pursuant to the
service contract.

Respondents had their own technical and veterinary staff that

was responsible for the day to day operations of the dairy.

Based upon similar

information in the record before the district court, Judge Bevan explained during his
oral discussion of his decision on the motions that:
"I am ruling as a matter of law that there are not sufficient facts to
send this to a jury relative to the exceptions of either the special
relationship and/or special circumstance ... "
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Tr., Vol. I, p. 77, LI. 8-11. Clearly, he saw no evidence to. establish that anything
more than a regular contractually based consumer relationship existed between
U.S. Dairy and Respondents.
As discussed above, Duffin, describes a specia·1 relationship arising in, " ...
situations where the relationship between the parties is such that it would be
equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited
group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's

economic interest."

Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,

1008 (Idaho 1995) (emphasis added).

It was further clarified that a special

relationship may exist only where one party conducts a highly specialized function,
and that, by so doing, induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill. See id.
The case focused on professional or quasi-professional relationships and only
slightly expanded that narrow focus to include the unique situation where the Idaho
Crop

Improvement

Association

only

because

the Idaho

Crop

Improvement

Association was the sole entity in Idaho authorized to certify seed potatoes.
id.

See

Furthermore, Duffin can clearly be read to deal with the provision of services,

not the sale of products.
In the present matter, Respondents were operating one of the largest dairies
in the country with a trained support staff.

It was Respondents' own personnel

who performed troubleshooting and repair of the barns, as is exemplified by the
fact that their technician allegedly observed a wiring defect in the first place. It is
not plausible to assert that contractual installation and maintenance relationship
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between U.S. Dairy and Respondents created any "special relationship" or duty on
the part of U.S. Dairy, when Respondents own technicians had the same skills to
diagnose problems and multiple other companies offered competing products and
similar services. U.S. Dairy simply provided limited maintenance and factory direct
parts as per the manufacturer's recommendations.

As noted earlier, U.S. Dairy

was not the only supplier of milking· equipment from whom the Aardemas could
choose.
U.S. Dairy does not fall within the clearly defined categories of professionals
who could qualify under the exception. Unlike engineers and architects, no special
certificate or license is necessary from the State of Idaho to work on the subject
milking systems. In fact, a large portion of the wiring involved in this matter is low
voltage and not subject to any local or state electrical codes or inspection.
Therefore, it is not practical to equate the service work provided by U.S. Dairy
employees to that of an engineer o.r other highly skilled field as contemplated by
the exception.
This Court in Duffin clearly intended to limit the application of the special
relationship exception to a fairly specific set of facts, none of which are present in
this matter.

Expanding the special relationship exception beyond what was

contemplated in Duffin would result an exception which would swallow the rule.
The services and products provided by U.S. Dairy are similar to those involved in
thousands of commercial transactions occurring every day in Idaho.
above, the UCC adequately governs these business transactions.
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As argued

Modifying the

exception to the extent that it would apply to the facts of this matter would affect
numerous industries within the state and eviscerate the effectiveness of the UCC.

II.

CONCLUSION

Here, the relationship between the Aardemas, Westfalia and U.S. Dairy is a
multilateral commercial tra·nsaction governed by the UCC, the manufacturer's
warranty and a service contract. To hold that tort law has any place in this case
would deprive - Westfalia and U.S. Dairy of their rights under the Uniform
Commercial Code.

Westfalia and U.S. Dairy had every right to believe that the

UCC was applicable to their transaction in light of the holding of Myers. This could
not be more clearly demonstrated than the application of Myers to pulsators in

DeVries v. De Laval, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41 599.

The Aardemas are

asking this Court to modify the law of Idaho regarding the economic loss rule.
Here the Aardemas failed to submit any admissible evidence for their contention
that they suffered injury to other property which qualifies for an exception to the
economic loss rule. Without such admissible evidence, the District Court erred in
failing to apply long established Idaho precedents. The Aardemas have also failed
to establish that any of the other exceptions to the economic loss rule apply.
Specifically, there is no evidence to support Respondents' claims that a special
relationship or unique circumstances existed between themselves or any of the
other parties.
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It is respectfully submitted that the tort claims .asserted by the
Aardemas must be dismissed with prejudice.
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Attorneys for Respondents
Ken M. Peterson
MORRIS, LAING, EVANS, BROCK &
KENNEDY,CHARTERED
Old Towne Square
300 North Meade, Suite 200
Wichita, KS 67202-2722
Attorneys for Respondents
William A. Morrow
Julie Klein Fischer
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, ID 83637
Attorneys for the Idaho Dairymen's
Association
David W. Gratton
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main Street
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for the Milking Machine
Manufacturers Council
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Robert A. Anderson
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